Guilty Pleas for Secret Swiss-Israeli Bank Accounts | FATCA Lawyer

/0 Comments/in , /by

On January 18, 2017, three US taxpayers pleaded guilty for hiding millions of dollars in their secret Swiss and Israeli bank accounts (hereinafter “Swiss-Israeli Bank Accounts”) and failing to report these Swiss-Israeli Bank Accounts on their FBARs.

Facts of the Case Involving Secret Swiss-Israeli Bank Accounts

All three defendants are relatives – Mr. Dan Farhad Kalili and Mr. David Ramin Kalili are brothers while Mr. David Shahrokh Azarian is their brother-in-law. They are all residents of Newport Coast, California.

According to the documents filed with the court and statements made in connection with the defendants’ guilty pleas, between May 1996 and 2009, Mr. Dan Kalili opened and maintained several undeclared offshore bank accounts at Credit Suisse and UBS in Switzerland. Similarly, Mr. David Kalili opened and maintained several undeclared accounts at Credit Suisse from February 1999 through at least 2009. He also owned several undeclared accounts at UBS from October 1993 through at least 2008. The brothers also maintained joint undeclared Swiss bank accounts at both UBS and Credit Suisse beginning in 2003 and 2004, respectively.

At the same time, Mr. Azarian opened and maintained several undeclared accounts at Credit Suisse from May 1994 through at least 2009. He also owned several accounts at UBS in Switzerland from April 1997 through at least 2008.

In 2006, we had the appearance of the now famous Ms. Beda Singenberger, a Swiss citizen who owned and operated a financial advisory firm called Sinco Truehand AG. She was indicted in New York on July 21, 2011. The charges were: conspiring to defraud the United States, evade U.S. income taxes, and file false U.S. tax returns. Ms. Singenberger remains a fugitive as of the time of this writing.

In July of 2006, Mr. Dan Kalili, with the assistance of Ms. Singenberger, opened an undeclared account at UBS in the name of the Colsa Foundation, a Liechtenstein entity. As of May 2008, the Colsa Foundation account at UBS held approximately $4,927,500 in assets.

In light of the increased IRS tax enforcement and the UBS case, all three defendants attempted to partially hide their prior ownership of Swiss accounts by moving the assets from one account to another. At the same time, they also tried to legitimize partial ownership of their assets.

Mr. Dan Kalili opened an undeclared account at Swiss Bank A in the name of the Colsa Foundation and in May 2008 and transferred his assets from the UBS Colsa Foundation account to Swiss Bank A. He then made partial disclosure of the Swiss Bank A Colsa account on his individual income tax returns. In 2009, Mr. Dan Kalili opened undeclared accounts at Israeli Bank A and at Bank Leumi, both in Israel. He then closed his joint (with his brother) Credit Suisse account and his own undeclared account and transferred all funds to Israel.

At that time of its closure, the undeclared joint account of Dan and David Kalili at Credit Suisse held approximately $2,561,508 in assets. As of December 2009, Dan Kalili’s undeclared account at Israeli Bank A had the approximate value of $1,569,973 and his undeclared account at Bank Leumi was valued at approximately $2,497,931.

Mr. David Kalili followed almost the same pattern. In August of 2008, he opened an account at Israeli Bank A in Israel and transferred to this account all of his funds from his UBS accounts. He later partially declared the Israeli Bank A account on his individual income tax returns. As of August 2009, Mr. David Kalili’s undeclared account at Israeli Bank A held assets valued at approximately $1,369,489.

Finally, Mr. Azarian also opened an account at Israeli Bank A in Israel in August of 2008. In May of 2009, he closed his Credit Suisse account and transferred all funds to his Israeli account. At the time of its closure, Mr. Azarian’s undeclared account at Credit Suisse held assets valued at approximately $1,903,214.

Neither of the three defendants ever filed an FBAR for their secret Swiss-Israeli Bank Accounts on their FBARs during any of the years 2006-2009.

Criminal and Civil Penalties Imposed For Failure to Declare Foreign Income and Swiss-Israeli Bank Accounts

According to the plea agreements, the criminal and civil penalties were severe. Mr. Dan Kalili, Mr. David Kalili and Mr. Azarian each face a statutory maximum sentence of five years in prison, a period of supervised release and restitution for 2003-2009 tax loss and monetary penalties. The defendants also admitted to committing civil fraud, which exposes them to additional civil fraud penalty.

In addition, each defendant agreed to pay a willful FBAR civil penalty in the amount of 50% of the highest balances of their undeclared Swiss-Israeli Bank Accounts. Mr. Dan Kalili agreed to pay the FBAR penalty of $2,674,329, Mr. David Kalili agreed to pay the FBAR penalty of $1,325,121 and Mr. Azarian agreed to pay the FBAR penalty of $951,607.

Lessons to Be Learned from the Defendants’ Handling of Their Undeclared Swiss-Israeli Bank Accounts

This case is a classical example of what not to do if one wishes to avoid criminal prosecution. Let’s point out five main mistakes which exposed the taxpayers to the IRS criminal prosecution.

The first mistake is obvious – the defendants willfully failed to declare their Swiss-Israeli bank accounts on their FBARs and the income generated by these accounts on their US tax returns.

The deleterious impact of the first mistake was magnified by the usage of an offshore shell corporation to hide the ownership of the Swiss-Israeli bank accounts (while the entity was concerned mostly with Swiss accounts, it was also used to hide the source of funds on the defendants’ Israeli bank accounts).

Third, the defendants engaged in the evasive pattern of opening and closing foreign accounts in various banks in order to hide them from the IRS. The defendants obviously underestimated the IRS ability to track these accounts and ended up giving the IRS additional powerful indirect evidence of intent to evade taxes and the willfulness of their failures to file FBARs.

Fourth, the taxpayers engaged in partial voluntary disclosure outside of any actual voluntary disclosure program. By doing partial disclosure, the taxpayers provided additional evidence to the IRS of their knowledge of the requirement to report foreign income and properly complete Schedule B. At the same time, the fact that their disclosure was only partial further emphasized the willfulness of their prior failure to disclosure foreign income and foreign assets. The readers should remember that a voluntary disclosure must always be accurate and complete; otherwise, the taxpayers simply give the IRS more evidence of willfulness of their tax noncompliance.

Finally, it does not appear that the taxpayers ever considered doing a true voluntary disclosure which could have limited their penalties and prevented the IRS criminal prosecution. One of the first thing that the taxpayers should always consider once they find out about their noncompliance or the possibility of the IRS detection of such noncompliance is to retain an international tax lawyer to review their voluntary disclosure options. The taxpayers failed to do so in this case and paid a very high price.

Contact Sherayzen Law Office for Professional Help with the Voluntary Disclosure of Your Foreign Income and Foreign Assets, including Swiss-Israeli Bank Accounts

If you have undisclosed foreign income and foreign assets, you should contact Sherayzen Law Office for professional help as soon as possible. Our international tax law firm has successfully helped hundreds of US taxpayers around the world to bring their tax affairs into full compliance with US laws and we can help you!

Contact Us Today to Schedule Your Confidential Consultation!

Taxation of Royalties Ceases Under Estonia-UK Tax Treaty | MN Tax Lawyer

/0 Comments/in , /by

On January 18, 2017, the HM Revenue & Customs announced that the withholding tax on royalties under the 1994 Estonia-UK tax treaty has been eliminated retroactively as of October 16, 2015.

Under the original Estonia-UK tax treaty, the rates had been 5 percent for industrial, commercial, and scientific equipment royalties and 10 percent in other cases. However, paragraph 7 of the Exchange Notes to the Treaty contains the Most Favoured Nation” (MFN) provision relating to royalties (Article 12). Under the MFN provision, UK tax residents only need to pay the lowest tax withholding rate ever agreed by Estonia in a Double-Taxation Treaty (DTA) it later agrees with an OECD member country that was a member when the UK-Estonia tax treaty was signed in 1994.

It turns that Switzerland was an OECD member country in 1994. In 2002, Estonia signed a tax treaty with Switzerland, but the treaty did not impact the UK withholding tax rate at that time. In 2014, however, Estonia and Switzerland signed an amending protocal to the 2002 Estonia-Switzerland tax treaty. Under the protocol, the treaty was revised to provide for only resident state taxation of royalties.

It was this provision in the 2014 protocol to the Estonia-Switzerland tax treaty that triggered the 1994 MFN provision of the Estonia-UK tax treaty. Therefore, when the 2014 protocol entered into force on October 16, 2015, it effectively eliminated tax withholding on royalties not only in Switzerland (wth respect to Estonia), but also in the United Kingdom. While the taxation of royalties under the Estonia-UK tax treaty ceased on October 16, 2015, the HM Revenue & Customs waited for more than a year to announce it on January 18, 2017.

It should be pointed out that MFN provisions, such as the one in Estonia-UK tax treaty, quite often have an important impact throughout the treaty network of a country. This ripple effect of the MFN provisions creates enormous opportunities for international tax planning that is often utilized by international tax lawyers, including US international tax law firms such as Sherayzen Law Office, Ltd.

Belarus-Hong Kong Tax Treaty Signed | MN International Tax Attorney

/0 Comments/in , /by

On January 16, 2017, the Belarus-Hong Kong Tax Treaty was signed by government officials from both countries – K.C. Chan, Hong Kong’s secretary for financial services and the treasury, and Sergei Nalivaiko, Belarusian minister of taxes and duties. Let’s explore the most important provisions of the new Belarus-Hong Kong Tax Treaty.

Elimination of Double-Taxation Under the Belarus-Hong Kong Tax Treaty

The new tax treaty will provide real benefits to businesses and individuals in both countries. In the absence of the treaty, the profits of Hong Kong companies earned through a permanent establishment in Belarus would be taxed in Belarus and Hong Kong. Similarly, prior to the treaty, the income earned by Belarusian companies in Hong Kong would be subject to both, Belarusian and Hong Kong taxation.

The Belarus-Hong Kong Tax Treaty will now eliminate the risk of double taxation by allowing Belarusian companies to claim a tax credit for taxes paid in Hong Kong. Similarly, Hong Kong companies will be able to claim tax credit for taxes paid in Belarus.

Belarus-Hong Kong Tax Treaty: Taxation of Dividends, Interest and Royalties

The new treaty establishes a 5% maximum tax rate for dividends and interest payments. This is a large reduction from the current highest rate of 13%. Moreover, in certain cases (mainly Hong Kong or Belarusian government-owned entities), dividends and interest are entirely exempt from taxation.

Additionally, under the new treaty, the royalties will generally be taxed also at 5%. However, if the royalties are paid for the use of (or the right to use) aircraft, then the tax withholding rate is further reduced to 3%. Again, this is a major reduction from the current highest rate of 15%.

Belarus-Hong Kong Tax Treaty: Concessions to Hong Kong Airlines

The special reduction for aircraft-related royalties is a major concession to Hong Kong Airlines, but it is not the only one. Additionally, Belarus agreed that Hong Kong Airlines operating flights to Belarus will be taxed at Hong Kong’s corporation tax rate. Furthermore, the profits from international shipping transport earned by Hong Kong residents that arise in Belarus (and which are currently taxed in Belarus) will now fully escape Belarusian taxation.

Belarus-Hong Kong Tax Treaty: Other Provisions and Entry into Force

The new treaty contains a number of other provisions regulating taxation of capital gains, pensions, government salaries and other income. Additionally, Article 25 of the treaty provides for exchange of tax-related information between Belarus and Hong Kong. This provision may have an unintended consequence for US tax residents who operate in Belarus and Hong Kong, because some information exchanged between Belarus and Hong Kong may be further provided to the United States under Hong Kong’s FATCA tax information exchange obligations.

The Belarus-Hong Kong Tax Treaty will enter into force once both sides complete their own ratification procedures.

IRS Civil Penalties and Voluntary Compliance | US International Tax Lawyer

/0 Comments/in , /by

There has been a spectacular growth in the number of the IRS civil penalties. In 1955, there were about 14 penalties in the entire Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”); on the other hand, today, there are over 150 penalties. The most recent growth in penalties has been driven mostly by offshore compliance concerns and the appearance of new requirements to address these concerns. FATCA Form 8938 is just the most recent example of this trend.

Does this growth in the IRS civil penalties mean that our tax system is shifting its focus from encouraging voluntary compliance to punishing abusive behavior? Let’s explore this issue from a historical perspective and try to answer the question.

The Stated Purpose of the IRS Civil Penalties

The US tax system is based on the taxpayers’ voluntary compliance with US tax laws. As I explained in a previous article, “voluntary compliance” really means the self-assessment of tax and the filing of tax returns by US taxpayers; the actual compliance with US tax laws is compulsory.

In other words, the Congress burdened the taxpayers with all of the hassle and complexity of US tax compliance and it still wants them to do it accurately, timely and in direct opposition to their self-interest of paying the least amount of tax. How can such a system function?

The solution lies in the creation of a system of the IRS civil penalties (a discussion of criminal penalties is outside of the scope of this article). The threat of the imposition of the IRS civil penalties during a random audit is meant to “encourage” voluntary compliance. This is the official purpose of the IRS penalties.

How exactly do the IRS civil penalties encourage voluntary compliance according to Congress? First, the penalties establish the standard of compliant behavior by defining noncompliance. Second, the penalties are meant to define the “remedial consequences” for noncompliant behavior. Finally, the IRS civil penalties impose monetary sanctions against the taxpayers and tax professionals who fail to comply with the aforementioned standard.

IRS Civil Penalties Must be Viewed as Precise and Proportional

Yet, in order to properly function and accomplish their goal of encouraging voluntary compliance, the IRS Civil Penalties must be viewed by the taxpayers as precise and proportional to the fault committed and the harm that resulted from that fault. In other words, the taxpayers must view the IRS Civil Penalties as a deterrence of improper conduct rather than punishing innocent taxpayers. If these penalties are viewed as excessive, the goal of voluntary compliance will be undermined.

Unfortunately, with respect to many IRS Civil Penalties, the taxpayers feel that they are disproportionate and imprecise. This is especially true with respect to international information tax returns, such as FBAR, Form 8938, Form 5471 and so on. The FBAR penalties are especially abhorred by the taxpayers because they apply to even non-willful conduct.

IRS Past Efforts to Change Taxpayers’ Perspective on the IRS Civil Penalties

The IRS has been trying to battle this impression of unfairness of the IRS civil penalties, though we cannot say that it has been entirely successful in this respect.

Already in February of 1989, the IRS Commissioner’s Executive Task Force issued a “Report on Civil Tax Penalties” which emphasized the complexity and perceived unfairness of the IRS Civil Penalties. This Report remains one of the key documents which has not been substantially modified for past twenty some years.

The report established a philosophy of penalties, provided a statutory analysis of the three broad categories of penalties (filing of returns, payment of tax and accuracy of information), and proposed a list of action items to resolve the inconsistencies between civil penalties.

Among these recommendations, the IRS proposed to:

(1) develop and adopt a single-penalty policy statement emphasizing that civil tax penalties exist for the purpose of encouraging voluntary compliance;

(2) develop a single consolidated handbook on penalties for all employees. The IRS emphasized that the handbook should be sufficiently detailed to serve as a practical everyday guide for most issues of penalty administration and provide clear guidance on computing penalties;

(3) revise existing training programs to ensure consistent administration of penalties in all functions for the purpose of encouraging voluntary compliance;

(4) examine its communications with taxpayers to determine whether these communications do the best possible job of explaining why the penalty was imposed and how to avoid the penalty in the future;

(5) finalize its review and analysis of the quality and clarity of machine-generated letters and notices used in various divisions within the IRS;

(6) consider ways to develop better information concerning the administration and effects of penalties; and

(7) develop a Master File database to provide statistical information regarding the administration of penalties. That IRS envisioned that the information would be continuously reviewed for the purpose of suggesting changes in compliance programs, educational programs, and penalty design and penalty administration.

1989 IMPACT’s Effect on the IRS Civil Penalties

The IRS efforts did not go unnoticed. The Congress responded by enacting the Improved Penalty and Compliance Tax Act (“IMPACT”) as part of its Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989.

It appears IMPACT had an overall salutary effect on the IRS civil penalties with respect to domestic activities. However, IMPACT’s role in curbing the perceived unfairness with respect to US international tax penalties has been minimal.

The Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 Changed the Way the IRS Civil Penalties Are Imposed

At the end of the 1990s, the Congress made one more effort to solidify the image of fairness with respect to the imposition of the IRS civil penalties. The Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 made a valuable contribution to maintaining the focus on encouraging voluntary compliance by creating the IRC Section 6751(b). IRC Section 6751(b) states that most of the IRS Civil Penalties (other than those automatically calculated by a computer) imposed after June 30, 2001, require a written managerial approval by the immediate manager or higher-level official of the employee who initially proposed the penalty.

The idea behind Section 6751(b) is to bring some restrain in the imposition of penalties by the “trigger-happy” employees. The extra level of review is further meant to promote the image of fairness of process during the imposition of the IRS Civil Penalties.

Conclusion: Encouragement of Voluntary Compliance Remains A Priority in General but the Emphasis on Abusive Transactions Dominates International Tax Law Compliance

Now that we have analyzed the IRS Civil Penalties from a historical perspective, let’s return to the original questions that I posed at the beginning of this article: does the growth in the number of the IRS civil penalties mean that our tax system is shifting its focus from encouraging voluntary compliance to punishing abusive behavior?

Based on the IRS past efforts to improve the taxpayer’s perception of the tax system and civil penalties and the Congress’ effort to encourage voluntary compliance through laws like IMPACT, one can say that, in general, the encouragement of voluntary compliance remains the main purpose of the IRS civil penalties.

There is one area, however, where the application of civil penalties has been driven not by only voluntary compliance considerations, but also by the desire to punish certain modes of behavior. This area is international tax law and, more precisely, abusive offshore transactions.

In fact, it appears more and more that the focus of the current tax policy is on punishing abusive offshore transactions irrespective of how it may affect innocent taxpayers. Since 2001, millions of taxpayers found themselves potentially facing draconian FBAR penalties solely for not reporting their foreign accounts. Thousands of small businesses also face large penalties associated with Forms 5471 and 8865 as well as other US international information return penalties. Finally, FATCA Form 8938 created with a new array of penalties and an added compliance burden to US taxpayers.

The fact that all of these forms may be necessary is not the issue. The problem is that the application of these forms has been indiscriminate almost irrespective of the actual income tax impact and the net worth of the taxpayer. For example, small businesses now have to comply with the burden of US GAAP compliance (normally applied only to publicly-traded companies) on Form 5471 or face severe IRS civil penalties for noncompliance. One non-willfully unreported foreign account which could have produced a few dollars of interest may be subject to a $10,000 FBAR penalty.

Naturally, the disproportionate and imprecise application of the IRS civil penalties in the area of the US international tax compliance has generated a great amount of discontent and resentment among the affected US taxpayers. This is precisely what IMPACT tried to avoid in order to encourage voluntary compliance.

This is why the IRS and Congress should work together to make the application of the IRS civil penalties more precise with respect to who should be paying these penalties and more proportionate to the actual fault (i.e. the damage sustained by the US treasury).