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§318 Entity-Member Attribution Summary | International Tax Lawyer

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In a previous article, I discussed the IRC (Internal Revenue Code) §318 sidewise attribution limitation. This limitation was the last piece in the jigsaw puzzle of the §318 entity-member attribution rules; now, we are ready to summarize these rules in light of this exception. This is the purpose of this article – state the §318 Entity-Member Attribution summary.

§318 Entity-Member Attribution Summary: Definition of Member

For the purpose of this §318 Entity-Member Attribution summary, I am using the word “member” to describe partners, shareholders and beneficiaries.

§318 Entity-Member Attribution Summary: Limitations

This summary of §318 entity-member attribution rules is limited only to situations where a member owns at 50% of the value of stock (in case of a corporation) and a beneficiary of a trust does not hold a remote and contingent interest in a trust. The readers need to keep these limitations in mind as they apply the summary below to a particular fact pattern.

Moreover, the readers must remember that this summary of the §318 Entity-Member attribution rules may be altered when one applies it within the context of a specific tax provision. Hence, the readers must check for any modification of these §318 attribution rules contained in that specific tax provision.

§318 Entity-Member Attribution Summary

Now that we understand the limitations above, we can state the following summary of the §318 Entity-Member attribution rules:

  1. All corporate stock is attributed to an entity from its member irrespective of whether the member owns this stock actually or constructively;
  2. If corporate stock is attributed from an entity to its member, such attribution will be done on a proportionate basis; and
  3. The following corporate stock is attributed from an entity to its member on a proportionate basis:
    (a). Corporate stock which the entity actually owns;
    (b). Corporate stock which the entity constructively owns under the option rules; and
    (c). Corporate stock which the entity constructively owns because it is a member of some other entity.

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EU Tax Harmonization Initiative Stalled by Ireland and Hungary | Tax News

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The EU Tax Harmonization initiative faced a joint opposition of Ireland and Hungary in early January of 2018. Both countries are vehemently opposed to any effort that would “tie their hands” in terms of their corporate tax policies.

The EU Tax Harmonization Initiative

Tax Harmonization is basically a policy that aims to adjust the tax systems of various jurisdictions in order to achieve one tax goal. The adjustment usually implies equalization of tax treatment.

In the past, the EU tax harmonization efforts were mostly limited to Value-Added Tax (“VAT”) and certain parent-subsidiary taxation issues. Since at least 2016, however, the EU Tax Harmonization policy seeks to regulate corporate income taxes among its members in order to limit intra-EU tax competition.

In 2016, the European Commission released two proposed directives addressing the issues of a common corporate tax base and a common consolidated corporate tax base. Neither directive establishes a minimum corporate tax rate. Neither directive passed the internal EU opposition.

Irish and Hungarian Opposition to the EU Tax Harmonization of Corporate Taxation

Today, the EU internal opposition to the EU tax harmonization initiatives consists of Ireland and Hungary. Both Hungary and Ireland have very low (by EU standards) corporate tax rates. The Irish corporate tax rate is 12.5% and the Hungarian corporate tax rate is only 9% (the EU average corporate tax rate is about 22%).

In early January of 2018, the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Irish Prime Minister Leo Varadkar both stated that their countries have the right to set their corporate tax policies and that this area should not be subject to the EU tax harmonization efforts. “Taxation is an important component of competition. We would not like to see any regulation in the EU, which would bind Hungary’s hands in terms of tax policy, be it corporate tax, or any other tax,” Mr. Orbán said. He further added that “we do not consider tax harmonization a desired direction.”

Both countries view the aforementioned proposed 2016 European Commission directives as a threat, because harmonizing of the tax base could lead to corporate income tax rate harmonization.

Impact of Brexit on the EU Tax Harmonization Initiatives

The United Kingdom used to be in the same opposition camp as Ireland and Hungary. Given the size of its economy and its political influence, the United Kingdom was an almost insurmountable barrier to the proponents of greater EU unity (mainly France and Germany). In essence, the UK was enough of a counterweight to keep the balance of power within the European Union from tilting in favor of the EU unity proponents.

Everything has changed with Brexit. The exit of the United Kingdom from the EU automatically led to the shift of the balance of power in favor of Germany. Brexit also means that Ireland and Hungary are now alone in their resistance against the Franco-German efforts to achieve greater EU unity. The political pressure of these outliers is now enormous.

In fact, it appears that, rather than suspending the unanimity requirement by invoking the so-called “passerelle clauses” (which would be a highly controversial step), the proponents of the EU Tax Harmonization initiative will simply wait until this political pressure forces Ireland and Hungary to modify their positions on this issue.