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Uruguay-US Social Security Agreement Sent to Congress | Tax Lawyer

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On March 19, 2018, President Trump sent the Uruguay-US Social Security Agreement to the US Senate. This is an important step toward the final ratification of the treaty that promises to benefit the citizens of both countries.

Uruguay-US Social Security Agreement: What is a Social Security Agreement?

A Social Security Agreement (also called a Totalization Agreement) is essentially a treaty between two countries that eliminates the burden of dual social security taxation for individuals and businesses who operate in both countries.

Typically, the potential for this type of double-taxation arises when a worker from country A works in Country B, but he is covered under the social security systems in both countries. In such situations, without a Social Security Agreement, the worker will have to pay social security taxes to both countries on the same earnings. A Social Security Agreement, on the other hand, allows the worker (and employers) to pay social security taxes only in one country identified in the treaty.

Social Security Agreements are authorized by Section 233 of the Social Security Act. Right now, only 26 Totalization Agreements are in force between the United States and another country: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Uruguay may become the 27th country to have a Social Security Agreement with the United States.

Uruguay-US Social Security Agreement: Recent History

The Uruguay-US Social Security Agreement has had a very favorable history so far. In fact, it may set the record for the fastest treaty ever negotiated by Uruguay. The countries first agreed to pursue a Social Security Agreement between them in May 2014, when the then Uruguayan president Jose Mujica was in Washington.

Amazingly, already in May of 2015, after just two rounds of talks held over a six-month period, the countries finished the negotiations of the Uruguay-US Social Security Agreement. Typically, it takes anywhere between two to three years to negotiate a Totalization Agreement.

On January 10, 2017, the Uruguay-US Social Security Agreement was signed in Montevideo. The United States was represented by its ambassador Mr. Kelly Kinderling. Uruguay was represented by its Foreign Minister Jose Luis Cancela and Labor and its Social Security Minister Ernesto Murro.

On October 3, 2017, the Uruguayan Senate approved the pending Uruguay-US Social Security Agreement, thereby completing the first part of the necessary ratification process. By sending the treaty to Congress for the required 60-day review period, President Trump started the US ratification process.

Uruguay-US Social Security Agreement: Benefits

According to Uruguay, the Uruguay-US Social Security Agreement will benefit some 60,000 Uruguayans working in the United States and up to 6,000 Americans living in Uruguay. The primary benefit is that the workers of both countries will be able to count the working years spent in both countries to be obtain eligibility for their home-country retirement, disability and survivor benefits.

Additionally, the Agreement will exempt US citizens sent by US-owned companies to work in Uruguay for five years or less from paying the Uruguayan social security taxes. Similarly, Uruguayan citizens sent to work temporarily in the United States by Uruguayan-owned companies will not need to pay social security taxes to the US government. Thus, employers in both countries will pay social security taxes only to their employees’ home countries.

Additionally, both countries hope that the Uruguay-US Social Security Agreement will boost trade between the countries. Currently, more than 200 American firms operate in Uruguay (mostly in the service sector).

Sherayzen Law Office will continue to monitor future developments with respect to this highly-beneficial treaty.

EU Tax Harmonization Initiative Stalled by Ireland and Hungary | Tax News

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The EU Tax Harmonization initiative faced a joint opposition of Ireland and Hungary in early January of 2018. Both countries are vehemently opposed to any effort that would “tie their hands” in terms of their corporate tax policies.

The EU Tax Harmonization Initiative

Tax Harmonization is basically a policy that aims to adjust the tax systems of various jurisdictions in order to achieve one tax goal. The adjustment usually implies equalization of tax treatment.

In the past, the EU tax harmonization efforts were mostly limited to Value-Added Tax (“VAT”) and certain parent-subsidiary taxation issues. Since at least 2016, however, the EU Tax Harmonization policy seeks to regulate corporate income taxes among its members in order to limit intra-EU tax competition.

In 2016, the European Commission released two proposed directives addressing the issues of a common corporate tax base and a common consolidated corporate tax base. Neither directive establishes a minimum corporate tax rate. Neither directive passed the internal EU opposition.

Irish and Hungarian Opposition to the EU Tax Harmonization of Corporate Taxation

Today, the EU internal opposition to the EU tax harmonization initiatives consists of Ireland and Hungary. Both Hungary and Ireland have very low (by EU standards) corporate tax rates. The Irish corporate tax rate is 12.5% and the Hungarian corporate tax rate is only 9% (the EU average corporate tax rate is about 22%).

In early January of 2018, the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Irish Prime Minister Leo Varadkar both stated that their countries have the right to set their corporate tax policies and that this area should not be subject to the EU tax harmonization efforts. “Taxation is an important component of competition. We would not like to see any regulation in the EU, which would bind Hungary’s hands in terms of tax policy, be it corporate tax, or any other tax,” Mr. Orbán said. He further added that “we do not consider tax harmonization a desired direction.”

Both countries view the aforementioned proposed 2016 European Commission directives as a threat, because harmonizing of the tax base could lead to corporate income tax rate harmonization.

Impact of Brexit on the EU Tax Harmonization Initiatives

The United Kingdom used to be in the same opposition camp as Ireland and Hungary. Given the size of its economy and its political influence, the United Kingdom was an almost insurmountable barrier to the proponents of greater EU unity (mainly France and Germany). In essence, the UK was enough of a counterweight to keep the balance of power within the European Union from tilting in favor of the EU unity proponents.

Everything has changed with Brexit. The exit of the United Kingdom from the EU automatically led to the shift of the balance of power in favor of Germany. Brexit also means that Ireland and Hungary are now alone in their resistance against the Franco-German efforts to achieve greater EU unity. The political pressure of these outliers is now enormous.

In fact, it appears that, rather than suspending the unanimity requirement by invoking the so-called “passerelle clauses” (which would be a highly controversial step), the proponents of the EU Tax Harmonization initiative will simply wait until this political pressure forces Ireland and Hungary to modify their positions on this issue.

Credit Suisse and Italy Settle Dispute Over Undisclosed Offshore Accounts

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On December 14, 2016, Credit Suisse and Italy settled their dispute over Credit Suisse undisclosed offshore accounts owned by Italian tax residents. The settlement between Credit Suisse and Italy was approved by a judge in Milan and obligates Credit Suisse to pay a total of 109.5 million euros – 101 million euros in taxes, interest and penalties; 7.5 million euros as a disgorgement of profits; and 1 million euros as an administrative penalty.

The settlement between Credit Suisse and Italy has ended an investigation by the Italian authorities into the bank’s involvement in helping Italians evade Italian taxes. The Italian government’s inquiry into the Credit Suisse’s role in Italian tax evasion appeared to be thorough and, at times, even combined with significant pressure. For example, in December of 2014, the Italian tax authorities raided the offices of a Credit Suisse’s subsidiary in Milan.

The agreement between Credit Suisse and Italy does not mean the end of the Italian tax authorities’ investigation of Italians with undisclosed offshore accounts. On the contrary, these activities will continue their relentless progress.

While a significant event, the settlement between Credit Suisse and Italy pales in comparison with the settlement between Credit Suisse and the US Department of Justice when Credit Suisse paid $2.6 billion.

Nevertheless, the settlement between Credit Suisse and Italy points to the continued global trend of increased focus on international tax compliance. The new trend really started with the IRS victory in the UBS case in 2008, gained steam with the 2009 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program and became worldwide with the passage of FATCA in 2010.

Countries throughout the world, including Italy, have followed the US lead in international tax enforcement. In fact, it appears that the European countries have gone further in some aspects than the United States, especially after the adoption of the Common Reporting Standard (CRS). While the United States refused to join CRS arguing that its revolutionary FATCA already achieved the same goals (and, thereby, effectively turning the United States into a tax shelter for nonresident aliens), the vast majority of the European countries adopted the CRS and applied unprecedented pressure on the financial industry to share the heretofore confidential information with various government tax authorities.

Switzerland has arguably felt more pressure than any other country in the world and has largely been forced to give up its much vaunted bank secrecy. After the US DOJ Program for Swiss Banks dealt the decisive blow to the Swiss bank secrecy laws, various European countries decided to take advantage of the Swiss banks’ defeat and swarmed into Switzerland to get their share of penalties and information regarding tax noncompliance of their own citizens. The recent settlement between Credit Suisse and Italy is just one more example of this continued European squeeze of the Swiss banks for money and information.

Form 872 Refund Claims | Foreign Accounts International Tax Lawyer

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The subject of this article is the discussion of the Form 872 Refund Claims, particularly whether filing Form 872 can extend the time for the taxpayer to claim a refund for the relevant years. Stated broadly, the key question that this article seeks to explore is whether an extension of time for assessment of tax can effect the taxpayer’s ability to file a refund claim for the extended years.

Form 872 Refund Claims – Form 872 and Offshore Voluntary Disclosures

Form 872 is a form used by the IRS to obtain the consent from the taxpayer to extend the time to assess tax. This consent can be obtained for income tax, self-employment tax of FICA tax on tips.

The form is used in a great variety of cases, but, in the US international tax context, it is mostly known for its use in the IRS Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (OVDP) now closed. Form 872 is in fact obligatory in the OVDP due to the fact that the OVDP voluntary disclosure period is eight years whereas the standard statute of limitations is only three years (even with 25% gross income, there are still at least two years that cannot be opened by the IRS without claiming fraud). Moreover, Form 872 is also used to prevent the statute of limitations from expiring for the rest of the years while the OVDP case is pending.

Form 872 Refund Claims: Form 872 Extends the Statute of Limitations for Refund Claims

According to IRC §6511(c), if the taxpayer and the IRS agree to extend the time within which the IRS can assess a tax, the taxpayer receives a corresponding extension of the time within which he may file a credit or refund claim. Form 872 itself states in paragraph 4 that:

Without otherwise limiting the applicability of this agreement, this agreement also extends the period of limitations for assessing any tax (including penalties, additions to tax and interest) attributable to any partnership items (see section 6231 (a)(3)), affected items (see section 6231(a)(5)), computational adjustments (see section 6231(a)(6)), and partnership items converted to nonpartnership items (see section 6231(b)). Additionally, this agreement extends the period of limitations for assessing any tax (including penalties, additions to tax, and interest) relating to any amounts carried over from the taxable year specified in paragraph (1) to any other taxable year(s). This agreement extends the period for filing a petition for adjustment under section 6228(b) but only if a timely request for administrative adjustment is filed under section 6227. For partnership items which have converted to nonpartnership items, this agreement extends the period for filing a suit for refund or credit under section 6532, but only if a timely claim for refund is filed for such items.

Limitations on Form 872 Refund Claims

There is an important limitation on Form 872 Refund Claims. Form 872 Refund Claims will only be accepted if the extension agreement is entered into before the expiration of the claim period. See IRC §6511(c)(1). This means that, if Form 872 is entered into by the parties by the time that the statute of limitations had already expired, the taxpayer is unlikely to succeed in his Form 872 Refund Claims.

The Form 872 agreement becomes effective when signed by the taxpayer and the District Director or an Assistant Regional Commissioner (See Treas. Reg. § 301.6511(c)-1).

Let’s look at a basic example to understand this limitation on Form 872 Refund Claims better.  Let’s suppose that a taxpayer X filed his 2003 US tax return on April 15, 2004. In March of 2007, the IRS decided to audit X’s 2003 US tax return and Form 872 was entered into by both parties at that time. In this case, without an agreement (and absent other special circumstances such as foreign tax credit issues, 25% under-reporting of income, et cetera), the presumed expiration of the assessment period would be on April 15, 2007; similarly, X’s refund claim period would have expired on April 15, 2007. Since Form 872 was entered into by both parties in March of 2007 (i.e. prior to the expiration of the normal refund claim period), however, X can file his Form 872 refund claims during the period that covers the duration of the extension plus six months thereafter.

Time to File Form 872 Refund Claims

As it was hinted in the example above, the period within which a taxpayer may file a credit or refund claim arising from the tax liability covered by Form 872 is extended for the period of the extension plus an additional six months. See IRC §6511(c)(1).

What Can Be Claimed on Form 872 Refund Claims

With respect to timely Form 872 Refund Claims, the taxpayer can claim an amount limited to the amount that would have been allowable under the normal limitation rules if the claim had been filed on the date the agreement was executed AND any tax paid after the execution of the agreement but before the filing of the claim. IRC §6511(c)(2).

What is the amount allowable under the normal limitation rules? It varies widely based on for what the refund is claimed (i.e. the type of the claim) and what is the filing period. For example, if Form 872 Refund Claims are filed within the three-year filing period, the amount of the refund or credit is limited to the tax paid on the liability at issue within the three years immediately preceding the filing of the claim plus the period of any extension of time for filing the return. IRC §6511(b)(2)(A). On the other hand, Form 872 Refund Claims based on a foreign tax credit adjustment can be granted many years back because the statute of limitations is ten years.

Form 872 Cannot Reduce the Claim Period for Form 872 Refund Claims

One final point that should be mentioned is that Form 872 and any other agreement to extend the assessment period cannot reduce the refund and credit claim period. The law clearly states that, when an extension agreement is executed, the taxpayer’s claim period shall not expire before the expiration of the additional assessment period plus six months.

Contact Sherayzen Law Office for Help With Your Form 872 Refund Claims

If you entered into a Form 872 agreement to extend the time to assess tax (whether as a result of OVDP, opt-out OVDP audit, FBAR Audit or regular audit) or any other type of agreement to extend the assessment period, contact Sherayzen Law Office for help with filing your Form 872 refund claims.

How IRS Can Get $718 Billion in Tax Revenue | International Tax Lawyer

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On October 4, 2016, the US Public Interest Research Group, Citizens for Tax Justice, and the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy issued a report called “Offshore Shell Games 2016: the Use of Offshore Tax Havens by Fortune 500 Companies”. The report calculates that eliminating all tax deferral on Fortune 500 US companies’ foreign earnings would allow the IRS to collect almost $718 Billion in additional US tax revenue.

Where does the Amount of $718 Billion Come From?

This amazing report targets the estimated $2.5 trillion in offshore earnings which are assumed to be mostly help by the US companies’ foreign subsidiaries in tax havens. The report calculates that the top 30 (meaning top 30 companies by the amount of offshore holdings) of the Fortune 500 companies account for two-thirds of the total, with Apple ($215 billion), Pfizer ($194 billion), and Microsoft ($124 billion) topping the list. It should be noted that some of the other estimates calculate the amount of total offshore earnings of US companies to be in excess of $5 trillion, i.e. double the amount used by the report.

The number of foreign subsidiaries owned by US multinationals is also impressive – the estimate runs as high as 55,000 subsidiaries owned just by Fortune 500 companies. The report states that, although many offshore subsidiaries do not show up in companies’ SEC filings, at least 367 of the Fortune 500 companies maintain subsidiaries in tax havens and the top 20 account for 2,509 of those entities. Subsidiaries of US multinationals reported profits of more than 100 percent of national GDP for five tax havens, including 1,313 percent for the Cayman Islands and 1,884 percent for Bermuda.

The most popular country for organizing the subsidiaries remains the Netherlands. However, Ireland, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Bermuda and Cayman Islands closely follow Netherlands in terms of their popularity among US multinationals.

How is $718 Billion Calculated?

The report sets forth its methodology for the calculation of $718 Billion. In essence, the report focuses on the data from 58 Fortune 500 companies to estimate the additional tax all of the companies would owe upon repatriation of funds to the United States. The final tax rate amount to about 28.8% of the repatriated income; the rest (i.e. the difference between the 35% US statutory rate and the 28.8%) is assumed to be the foreign tax rate that the companies will be able to use as a foreign tax credit to offset their US tax liability. Once 28.8% rates is applied to $2.5 trillion, the total amount of additional tax due to the IRS by the Fortune 500 companies is estimated to be close to $718 Billion.

This methodology, however, is not without its flaws. First, as I already referenced above that the amount of funds in foreign subsidiaries may be substantially higher than the estimated $2.5 trillion. Second, the report’s assumption of 6.2% of foreign tax rate may be too generous, especially for foreign companies owned by US persons for generations; in reality, a lot of companies are able to escape all taxation on a substantial amount of their income. Hence, the $718 Billion amount may actually be an understatement.

How Does the Report Propose to Collect the $718 Billion?

The report offers three approaches to the problem of collecting the $718 billion. The first approach is deceptively simple – end all tax deferral. The problem that I see with this approach is that it essentially expands US tax jurisdiction to foreign entities (which are non-resident alien business structures) to the extent that these entities automatically become US persons as soon as any US person becomes an owner of all or any part of them. In addition to the obvious legal problems with such an approach, there is also a potential to create a real chilling effect to US activities overseas. At the very least, the proposed course of action should be modified to include only controlled foreign entities and large US corporations.

The second approach is less radical; the report suggests tighter anti-inversion rules, elimination of the check-the-box election and the elimination of aggressive tax planning through intellectual property transfers. While many of these rules may be effective to combat future aggressive tax planning, they are unlikely to influence the current IRS inability to collect the $718 billion in additional tax revenue.

Finally, the report also lends support to the Obama administration’s (which is actually not a resurrection of older proposals) tax proposal to treat as subpart F income excess profits earned by a controlled foreign corporation from US-developed intangibles. The administration’s proposal is to expand the definition of Subpart F income to all excess income taxed at 10% or less (later expanded to 15%) would be included in subpart F. While a sensible proposal, it also seems to fall short of the expected $718 billion in additional tax revenue.

Also, it seems strange that all of the proposals seems to put foreign companies owned by small US firms and those owned by large US firms on the same footing. This kind of seemingly non-discriminatory approach has had a disproportionally heavy impact on small US firms’ ability to conduct business overseas due to lower resources that small firms can devote to the same type of tax compliance as that required of the Fortune 500 companies.